"One of the beauties of Pacific history," Scarr notes, "is the richness of the documentary material" (Daws 1979:126). Even a cursory examination suggests the vast literature that exists on the subject. Denning's (1980) study of the Marquesas, for example, contains more than 950 references; Gunson's (1978) study of South Sea missionaries over 750.

This rich, historical documentation is not simply happenstance; it results from the interaction of several factors. In respect to Western literature concerning the contact period, for instance, at least three factors played a prominent role. "The second half of the eighteenth century," Frost observes, "saw the beginnings of scientific exploration and survey of, and collection in, vast regions of the globe" (Frost 1979:5). In addition, advances in navigation meant that sea travel was safer during this period, encouraging scientists and artists to accompany the explorers. "A vessel like Cook's Resolution . . . combined the values of a fortress and a travelling laboratory" (B. Smith 1960:2). The rate of literacy also rose considerably at this time among certain groups. In England it doubled among men. "Literary ambition and disposition to authorship" (Burney in J. C. Beaglehole 1967:1xxxix) led numerous people to keep records of their voyages. On Cook's third voyage alone, at least 27 individuals kept accounts.

Other factors—missionary concerns with literacy and Polynesian concerns with tradition—encouraged the production of an indigenous literature. Koskinen (1953:21) notes, "the missionaries began to create a literary form for the native languages at the same time that they themselves learnt to master them. It was considered necessary to teach the heathen the Gospel by means of the written word, as well as by preaching." A desire to record past memories supposedly motivated 'I'i, a
Hawaiian historian, to write on the Hawaiian past. Another Hawaiian historian, Malo (1951:1-2), began his manuscript on *Hawaiian Antiquities*—written around 1840—by observing, “when traditions are carried in the memory [alone] it leads to contradictory versions [they are] made worthless.”

But this richness of historical documentation is a mixed blessing. Its very vastness has proved intimidating at times to scholars. Few have developed broad, comparative analyses that integrate materials from diverse island groups. In contrast to Scarr’s above quote, John Ward (1966:198) observes: “A major obstacle to writing the history of the British islands in the Pacific is the complexity and extent of the sources that have to be studied.”

The material, moreover, contains definite biases. The literature is weighted far more toward Western perspectives than toward Polynesian ones. (The main exception to this trend is in Hawaii, where a good collection of indigenous literature exists for the nineteenth century.) Although one can appreciate the reasons for the differential production in written materials between the two groups, the result is an unfortunate one. Indigenous perspectives are often underrepresented in scholarly studies. This constitutes a significant problem since data suggest Polynesians perceived certain historical events in rather different terms from Europeans. European and Hawaiian accounts disagree, for instance, as to whether Cook had a sexual liaison at Kaua‘i.

Also, writings by Hawaiian historians such as Malo, ‘īi, and Kamakau frequently involved retrospective data collected years after contact. People’s recollections were open to a variety of distortions. Regarding the assertion that Cook was murdered for his *tabu* violations—a statement recorded by Lt. Peter Puget of Vancouver’s squadron—Sahlins (1981a.26) comments that “if the interpretation was historically inaccurate as of 1 February 1779, it had become true as of 1793,” a result of Cook’s changed status in Hawaiian eyes.

There are other difficulties as well. Various retrospective accounts portray Polynesian traditions in uniform or static terms, thereby missing their varied and dynamic nature. Indicative of this problem is the procedure the missionary Dibble followed in his research on Hawaiian traditions: “At the time of [our] meeting each scholar read what he had written—discrepancies were reconciled and corrections made by each other, and then all the compositions were handed to me, out of which I endeavored to make one connected and true account” (Dibble 1843:iv). We must be careful not to fall into this trap today. Much of Malo’s book apparently derives from information accumulated on the island of Hawai‘i, and from Malo’s association with the chief Auwai. One must be careful, as a result, in generalizing Malo’s account to the archipelago as a whole. Significant cultural difference existed within the group.
Nuances of language may also lead scholars astray. Westerners often termed Polynesian attempts to appropriate their goods theft, implying a set of legal associations that were often inappropriate for the situation.

A valuable way of perceiving the complexities involved in analyzing this literature is to review the ways historians and anthropologists have examined the material to date. Both groups have encountered similar problems.

**Historical Approaches**

Understanding how historians have approached Pacific history involves grasping what modern historians usually regard as two different perspectives. The first is called imperial, or Eurocentric, history. It dominated the field into the 1950s. As the name implies, it focuses on the imperial expansion of the European powers. According to Davidson (1966:6) the perspective emphasizes the Western “acquisition of sovereignty or of political control, the establishment of law and administration; emigration from the mother country to the colonies; commerce within the empire; and, behind all these and giving unity to the whole, the notion of a ‘civilizing mission.’ ” Of particular concern is the formal role played by Western explorers, administrators, and missionaries in this expansion. “Before the late 1940s,” Ralston (1985:156) asserts, Pacific history “focused almost exclusively on the exploits and ambitions of Western imperial and missionary agents.”

Today, imperialistic accounts are often viewed as reflecting certain biases. One that is frequently cited concerns Pacific islanders’ limited influence on historical events. In imperialistic works Pacific island populations were depicted as “the passive victims of alien exploitative trading and labor recruiting practices” (Ralston 1985:157). Another frequently cited bias involves an overemphasis on the West’s fatal impact. According to Howe (1984:350), certain imperialist writers suggested that Europeans “have caused nothing but disruption and dislocation of the [Pacific] Islanders’ lifestyles.”

The second historical approach to Polynesian-Western interactions is termed island-oriented history, or the new historiography. It has dominated Pacific history since the 1960s. In contrast to imperialistic history, island-oriented history emphasizes the less formal agents of European expansion: beachcombers, traders, and whaling crews. Building on C. R. Fay’s concept of informal empire, Davidson, the approach’s reputed founder, stressed “the importance of looking at the activities of private Europeans who were not representatives of their nations nor agents of their governments but simply people following their own interests and careers outside the political boundaries of empire as well
as within them" (West 1973:115). Howe, an island-centered historian, asserts it is "not sufficient to concentrate on explorers, missionaries, and government agents. A lowly beachcomber, an impoverished sandalwood trader, a ragged whaling crew in search of rest and recreation might perform activities or make observations as significant as those of any top-hatted evangelist or ostrich-plumed governor" (Howe 1984: xiii).

Island-oriented history, in Maude's (1971:20) phrasing, emphasizes the perspectives of the governed more than that of the governors. It examines European expansion from the perspectives of those who resided on the Pacific islands. The emphasis is on the ways European policies and approaches were shaped by local conditions. Cultural interaction, not cultural domination, is the focus of concern. The fatal nature of Western impact is questioned, and the active role that indigenous populations played in determining their own fates is stressed. Howe (1984:348) asserts that "recent historical research suggests that the processes of cultural contact were not always . . . one-sided, that Islanders were quite capable of taking their own initiative and, rather than passively accepting Europeans and their ways, either rejected or deliberately exploited the newcomers for their own reasons."

Although the island-oriented perspective dominates the modern literature and has gained widespread acceptance, it must be treated with a degree of caution. Accounts involving this perspective often contain biases that readers should be aware of in order to understand the state of Pacific history today. First, they tend to stereotype imperial history as emphasizing the fatal impact when that was not the sole, or even primary, concern of many works within this category. Moreover, in asserting the active role of Pacific islanders in the contact process, there has been a tendency among island-centered historians to pass over the fact that serious disruptions and dislocations did occur on many islands. As Oliver comments in his review of Howe's book Where the Waves Fall (1984): "to assert that any sizeable percentage of island cultures has escaped "disruption and dislocation" during those early decades of contact is to ignore a huge mass of credible, first-hand accounts" (Oliver 1984:C12). Finally, despite assertions to the contrary, modern historical accounts have continued to remain mostly Eurocentric in character. They still focus on European actions. Ralston (1985:151), an island-centered historian, admits that although "a move from agents of the imperial metropolitan powers to small-time operators on the periphery has . . . been effected, . . . [Pacific history] was and still is organized through foreign factors."

Two historical circumstances helped shape the biases modern Pacific historians often manifest in describing their field. Just as many imperial histories were written during the colonial era—and reflect the influences of that period—island-centered history has developed during the recent
post-colonial period and reflects its influences. Modern Pacific history, Maude (1971:24) asserts: “has a very practical and therapeutic role to enact in assisting the rehabilitation of the Pacific peoples at the end of a traumatic era of European political, economic and technological ascendency by renewing their self-respect and providing them with a secure historical base from which to play their part as responsible citizens of independent or self-governing communities in a new world.”

Island-centered history developed during Davidson’s tenure as chair of the Pacific History Department at the Research School of Pacific Studies in the Australian National University. In formulating a new approach to Pacific history, scholars associated with the Department at times overstated the biases of earlier writers. As these historians came to dominate the field, their perspectives became embedded in the literature. The department’s influence is quite impressive. Even as early as 1971, Maude was able to observe that scholarly publications associated with the Department of Pacific History outnumbered all other works in the field added together.

Now into its third decade, various Pacific historians have begun reflecting on what has (and has not) been accomplished by the island-centered approach. On the strong side, it has led to the re-evaluation of the nature of European-islander contacts. As Ralston notes: “Davidson’s dictum that the subdiscipline of Pacific history should be island-oriented led to the reconsideration of many highly eurocentric interpretations of past interactions between Islander and white. Long-held beliefs that Islanders were the passive victims of alien exploitative trading and labor recruiting practices were convincingly exposed as false or only partial truths” (Ralston 1985:156-157).

For Polynesia, the island-centered approach has produced a series of outstanding monographs, including France (1969), Gilson (1970), Gunson (1978), Maude (1968, 1981), Newbury (1980), and Ralston (1978). These publications provide a foundation on which to build general, comparative analyses.

Still, problems remain to be solved. First, a major difficulty exists regarding how to move beyond Eurocentric accounts. Maude has suggested collecting indigenous oral materials. But as Borofsky (1987) notes, such accounts often have their own biases and inaccuracies.

Second, beyond its concern with less Eurocentric views and less formal agents of European expansion, island-centered history has yet to develop a theoretical perspective to draw its empirical studies together. Discussing Spate’s (1979, 1983) and Howe’s (1984) recent attempts at synthesis, Ralston (1985:158) comments, “their works are most important additions to the field, but neither, despite the scope of their endeavors, has offered encompassing generalizations or theoretical insights into what are basically empirical studies.”

Third, deriving from its restricted theoretical vision, and very much
tied to it, has been the approach's limited concern with comparative analysis. Howe states the point well.

Researchers have been so diligently ferreting out and publishing their detailed findings that a good many of them have lost any basic sense of direction. They have become too immersed in the internal complexities to see the general background. Pacific islands history is a breeding ground for more and more highly specialized articles, monographs, and symposia. Few writers seem able to pull back from the microcosm to consider the implications, if any, for a broader or macrocosmic view of [Pacific] islands’ history (Howe 1979:83).

Ralston’s (1978) account of beachcomber communities is one of the best comparisons. Yet as Campbell indicates, she “fails to take full advantage of the [comparative] method. Comparison should produce more than just a new set of generalizations; it should alert one to explanations, ramifications, and strands of causality which one might otherwise miss because of their obscurity, or because they are too obvious” (Campbell 1978:190).

As a result of these recent reflections, a sense of uncertainty or caution, depending on whom one reads, has developed regarding the direction of Pacific history. Routledge (1985:81) suggests that a certain “pertinacity of doubts” exists today regarding the field’s goals.

**Anthropological Approaches**

Although anthropologists have approached Polynesian-Western interactions from a different perspective, they have, like Pacific historians, faced difficulties in enunciating details of their perspective within a broad, comparative framework. Here again it is helpful to examine two different, but related, approaches.  

The first aims at reconstructing Polynesian cultures prior to Western contact. Although it does not, strictly speaking, address issues of Polynesian-Western interaction, its value lies in establishing a baseline from which to explore changes in the post-contact period. The problems inherent in this endeavor can best be illustrated by examining two recent efforts: Oliver’s (1974) account of ancient Tahitian society and Valeri’s (1985a) account of Hawaiian religion.

Oliver’s *Ancient Tahitian Society* (1974) has been well received in reviews. Firth (1976:565) describes the three-volume work as “amply documented, carefully annotated sensitively analyzed, [allowing] us for the first time to base our reflections, comparisons—and speculations—about ancient Tahitian society on a firm foundation of
clearly sifted evidence.” The reason for such praise is Oliver’s judicious interpretation of the data. To quote Newbury (1976:244), “the care and circumspection with which [the recorded evidence] is treated sets a very high standard in ethnohistorical ‘reconstruction’. The temptation to indulge in new theories about social and political change is avoided the lasting impression is a healthy scepticism about the limits to our knowledge.”

Though not always specified in print, a hesitancy is sometimes voiced among scholars regarding what is referred to as Oliver’s limited theoretical vision. It is relevant therefore for readers to understand Oliver’s position in this respect. When Dening (1985b:103), commenting on Oliver’s later book, Two Tahitian Villages, gently chides Oliver for refusing “to say what he thinks [his study] means in relationship to wider issues,” Oliver replies that he is concerned with ethnographies per se: “first, with making them fuller, more faithful representations of various distinctive ways of life; and secondly, doing so objectively and in language that will permit them to be compared one with another.” He considers this “to be a sufficient goal in itself, one that does not require any other justification” (Oliver 1985:111-112).

Valeri’s Kingship and Sacrifice (1985a) has received a more ambivalent reaction. Sahlins praised the book on the dust jacket of Kingship and Sacrifice, but Charlot (1987:111) comments that Valeri “often announces his interpretation rather than offering arguments in support of it.” And Alan Howard (1986a:531-532), while acknowledging the insightfulness of Valeri’s analysis, asserts that his desire to impose coherence on the data leads him to underplay the diversity and fluidity of Hawaiian culture. The reason for this ambivalent reaction, we believe, lies in Valeri’s strong interpretative program: he orders the data in accordance with a set of axiomatic propositions. Although this allows him to tie together seemingly disparate information in an insightful manner, it also leads to questionable interpretations.

Scholars disposed toward reconstruction are thus often caught in a bind. When they move beyond simply trying to present the data in a coherent manner—not an easy task given their fragmented and ambiguous character—authors open themselves to charges of misinterpretation. But to take the more cautious route means that critical issues of theoretical and comparative importance may never be addressed by those most sensitive to the material’s significance.

A second anthropological approach focuses on the processes of cultural change. Recent works by Dening and Sahlins are prime examples. Examining their publications, we perceive some of the problems now facing anthropologists studying cultural change.

Dening (1980) presents an in-depth narrative of Marquesan history from 1774 to 1880, interspersed with a set of reflections regarding the
processes at work. Overall, the book has been well received. Boutilier 
(1982-1983:755) calls it "a brilliant piece of ethnohistorical and histori­
cal research," and Spate (1980:22) describes Dening's reflections as 
"penetrating essays on the human condition." Still, despite its generally 
warm reception, a problem exists. There is a gap between Dening's 
astute reflections and the details of his historical narrative. Both are of 
high quality. But we never see precisely how one fits into the other. To 
give Dening his due, he is sensitive—more than most scholars—as to 
how we impose our meanings on the past. Rather than provide an artifi­
cial order to events, he prefers leaving the relation between narrative 
and reflections ambiguous. Writing history, Dening (n.d.:42) observes, 
"is inevitably an exegesis of an exegesis."

Sahlins' work (1981a, 1985) appears to be better integrated. The 
dynamic interplay between structure and process, culture and history, 
are explored through details of early Hawaiian-European contact. His 
work, too, has been well received. Leach (1985:220) terms Historical 
Metaphors and Mythical Realities brilliant, and Gathercole (1986:24) 
asserts "Sahlins has a formidable ability to take ideas . and give 
them new cutting edges . [Islands of History is a] highly stimulating 
discussion of the relationship between history and structure." But 
Sahlins ultimately faces the same problem as Dening. Although his 
broad generalizations are embedded in a historical narrative, at times 
he is selective concerning the evidence marshaled to support his points, 
and some reviewers have questioned his analyses on this account. Thus, 
like the formulation of cultural reconstructions, the study of social 
change is confronted with a tension between broad generalization and 
supporting details. Rarely are the two fully integrated within a single 
analysis.

A Suggested Approach

As other authors in this volume have done, we would like to suggest 
some possible directions for future research. What follows is an attempt 
to reframe certain issues in a way that may make them more amenable 
to resolution.

First, we believe there is value in maintaining a dialogue between 
modern ethnographic and reconstructionist perspectives. Little direct 
evidence exists to illuminate Polynesian perspectives at the time of con­
tact, but we can use modern anthropological interpretations to gain 
insight into the cultural logics formerly at work in Polynesian societies. 
Present-day ethnographic writings can suggest the contexts that framed 
Polynesians' actions, that gave their behaviors meaning, in the past. 
The model we have in mind is somewhat akin to Braudel’s structures of
the longue durée—the enduring structures of a society that persist through centuries. For instance, in the following analysis we emphasize Polynesian concerns with status, on the assumption that status rivalries have constituted a persistent theme in Polynesian societies over the long term.

Obviously there are limits to such a procedure. One must be cautious about interpreting the past in terms of the present. But if we are clear about our assumptions and the limitations they impose on our analyses, there is value in maintaining a dialogue between modernist and reconstructionist perspectives.

Second, it is important to move beyond the examination of individual cases, individual exchanges, to the flow of Polynesian-Western interaction at specific locales over time. There is no doubt that Europeans misconstrued Polynesian motives and vice versa. Still we can gain a sense of each party's perspective by examining sequences of interactions at particular sites. Noting how event B followed event A and how this, in turn, seemingly led to event C, we can begin to understand the meaning each party's actions had for the other. We can begin to see Polynesian and Western cultures in process, adjusting to and negotiating a relationship with the other over time.

Third, we feel there is much value in developing controlled comparisons across a number of island groups. Such comparisons offer a valuable framework within which to analyze individual case studies. We will suggest, for example, that violent conflicts tended to represent a stage within a broader pattern of early Polynesian-Western relations. We then use this perspective to make sense of events on specific islands; exploring when and how violence occurred at Samoa in contrast to Tahiti, at Hawaii in contrast to the Marquesas.

Fourth, it is important to be aware of the limitations of the data. We believe Dening and Oliver are correct in emphasizing the tentative nature of broad generalizations. Given the problems already noted, a sense of caution is not only helpful, it is crucial to sound analysis. An awareness of the limitations should not simply be admitted and then indirectly dismissed. As Dening illustrates in his Marquesan study, the data's limitations need to frame the very analysis.  

In the remainder of this chapter we compare Polynesian-Western interaction on four Polynesian archipelagoes. Utilizing the fact that early explorers often visited the same locales (because of their known anchorages), we follow Polynesian-Western interaction at specific sites, observing the processual nature of relations over time. In the Marquesas, we explore the first five Western visits to Vaitahu Bay on Tahuata. Mendaña in 1595, Cook in 1774, Ingraham in 1791, Marchand later in 1791, and Hergest in 1792. For the Society Islands, we study the first four visits to Tahiti. Wallis at Matavai in 1767, Bougain-
ville at Hitia’a in 1768, Cook at Matavai in 1769, and Boenechea off Tai’arapu in 1772. For Hawaii, we examine the first five visits to the island group (focusing on Hawai‘i and Kaua‘i, where visitors stopped the longest): Cook at Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau in 1778; Cook (and Clerke) at Hawai‘i, Kaua‘i, and Ni‘ihau in 1778-1779; Portlock and Dixon at Hawai‘i, O‘ahu, and Ni‘ihau in 1786; La Pérouse at Maui in 1786; and Portlock and Dixon again at Hawai‘i, O‘ahu, Kaua‘i, and Ni‘ihau in 1786-1787. Finally, for Samoa we focus on the first five visits listed by Gilson (1970:65-67) focusing on Tutuila: Roggeveen in 1722, Bougainville in 1768, La Pérouse in 1787, the HMS *Pandora* with its tender in 1791, and Bass in 1802.8

**Trade Negotiations and the Issue of Theft**

The nature of Polynesian actions during early encounters remains somewhat enigmatic. Direct data are too few and too ambiguous to shed light on what lay behind various Polynesian actions. We might add that the intentions of Europeans have not always been clear either, despite a seeming wealth of documentation regarding their viewpoints. Our task in this section is to explore avenues for improving our understanding of the perspectives Europeans and Polynesians brought to their encounters with one another. To illustrate our approach, we will focus on the issue of theft during the early days of contact.9

Numerous accounts indicate that European explorers were upset by unsanctioned appropriation of their property. “Thieving by Polynesians,” Dening (1966:40) notes, “almost drove the sea-captains to distraction.” The most common explanation is that Polynesians did not recognize Western conceptions of private property. “It was no more possible for the islanders to keep their hands off the Europeans’ belongings,” Moorehead (1966:21) asserts, “than it was for the Europeans to abandon their rule that private property was sacred.” Dodge (1976:34) adds: “the Tahitians .. had no idea of personal property as understood by Europeans.” Pearson (1969) develops this theme by suggesting that Europeans misunderstood the protocol surrounding the arrival of drift voyages. The vessel and its entire contents were given over to the host who then, in turn, was obliged to provide voyagers with new items on their departure. “Whatever the islanders might have considered to be their rights over the property of their visitors,” Pearson (1970:140) remarks, “it is certain that the Europeans recognized no such understanding.”

Despite the frequency with which scholars cite these explanations, we should be cautious about accepting them. European sea captains were not all equally upset by Polynesian actions in this regard. Although
every explorer expressed concern about the problem of theft, Wallis, Cook, Portlock, and Dixon seemed significantly more disturbed by it than Bougainville and Marchand. The same explorer, moreover, responded in different ways on different occasions. Although Cook reacted rather sharply to some incidents, he seemed far more tolerant of others. Polynesian chiefs likewise projected variable attitudes. Many chiefs participated, directly or indirectly, in the unsanctioned appropriation of shipboard property. Banks commented that during Cook’s first voyage to Tahiti, “the chiefs were employd in stealing what they could in the Cabbin while their dependents took every thing that was loose about the ship, even the glass ports” (J. C. Beaglehole 1962, 1:263). Yet some chiefs prevented their subordinates from taking things and even helped Europeans regain lost items. Banks appreciatively records the assistance of Tubourai (Tupura’a i Tamaiti) in this respect. Waxing poetic, Banks calls him Lycurgus after the Greek law giver (J. C. Beaglehole 1962, 1:258). What we have, in other words, is a range of reactions on both sides to Polynesian appropriation of European possessions.

European Perspectives

To properly understand the nature of such incidents it is not sufficient to limit our investigation to specific attitudes of particular individuals. It is also essential to comprehend the broader contexts that framed the interactions. Both the explorers’ journals and modern histories indicate that certain medical, technological, and social factors shaped the actions of the Western explorers during this period. Scurvy, for example, was a problem that seriously affected many ships’ crews. Medical science had still not accurately diagnosed the causes of the disease, with the result that various folk theories prevailed. Thus de Langle regarded fresh water as a palliative, and Cook advocated the use of malt. The one measure explorers usually agreed upon in treating scurvy was the value of island visits, on time spent ashore.

Western ships, moreover, faced storage problems. As Oliver noted (1961:86), the “small ships had neither space nor facilities for carrying the right quantities and kinds of food and water and fuel required on long voyages.” European explorers usually arrived at Polynesian islands short, at times even destitute, of provisions. Visiting the islands was not simply a pleasant change of pace; it was often a dire necessity if the ships were to complete their missions.

The Europeans’ technological edge in weaponry also shaped early interactions with Polynesians. Numerous journal entries underscored the widespread observation that the latter were intimidated by shipboard firepower. Boenechea wrote about “the terror and dread in which
they hold our weapons” (in Corney 1913:333). And Banks noted that Tahitians “often described to us the terror which [Wallis’ guns] put them into” (in J. C. Beaglehole 1962, 1:307). European weapons had their limitations, however. Gunpowder was ineffective when wet (which, in part, is why the French failed to defend themselves effectively at Samoa), and Polynesians could overwhelm musket-firing soldiers if they attacked en masse at close quarters, preventing the soldiers from reloading (as happened at Hawai’i).

Dependent on sailpower, and possessing boats that drew several feet of water, European ship captains sought protected bays with safe anchorages for their stays. That Western ships repeatedly visited Matavai at Tahiti, and Vaitahu in the Marquesas, had to do with the nature of the harbors these locations afforded. The requirements of European shipping thus facilitated certain Polynesian groups’ developing long-term relations with Europeans, though—and this is important—the relations did not usually involve the same European individuals. Nonetheless each group was able to build a set of understandings regarding the other. Bougainville’s positive reception at Tahiti, Pearson (1969) asserts, derived from Wallis’ earlier use of force there. By Bougainville’s visit, Tahitians had come to appreciate the lethal qualities of Western weaponry. Westerners learned from each other’s journals effective ways for resolving problems at particular anchorages. Commenting on the regulations Cook drew up for his visit to Tahiti in 1769, J. C. Beaglehole (1974:176) observes “obviously Cook had . . . paid attention to Wallis’ journal.” And when La Pérouse successfully placed his ship under tapu at Maui, to keep Hawaiians off it, he noted he “had learned [about the word tapu] from the English accounts” (La Pérouse 1799, 1.342–343).

If we are to believe the explorers’ journals (and biographies about them), many of the sea captains used force only with reluctance. Beaglehole notes that Cook “as a humane man . . . took Lord Morton’s reminder] seriously” to “restrain the wanton use of Fire Arms” and to view the shedding of blood among the people visited as “a crime of the highest nature” (Beaglehole 1974:187, 150). We can see this concern to avoid violence in Wallis’ initial encounter with Tahitians. When Tahitians “cheated” the British in trade and struck several of the sailors (on June 21), Wallis gave “strict orders that no man should hurt or molest” them (Robertson 1973:28). And when the Tahitians took some of the water casks (on June 23), Gore tried to demonstrate, without actually wounding anyone, the effective range of Western firearms by firing a musketoon in front of them. (The Tahitians were startled by the gun’s noise, but failed to realize they were supposed to watch where the shot landed, making Gore’s lesson a failure.) Obviously this humane perspective did not always dominate, and it is questionable
whether it was shared by many ordinary seamen. But the journals do suggest that a sense of restraint shaped many sea captains' initial encounters because they wanted to view themselves (and have readers of their journals view them) as "civilized," as being able to use reason rather than brute force in their interactions with non-Western groups.

It is within this context that one can make sense of European concerns for the unsanctioned appropriation of their shipboard property. What upset the explorers more than the violation of their sacred property rights, we believe, was the way Polynesian actions affected trade, especially how it undermined the Europeans' ability to assign high valuations to their goods. To allow goods to disappear overboard, without getting needed supplies in return, meant the ships had less to trade with, less to exchange for provisions, after the initial overtures of hospitality had passed. It is critical here to remember a point previously made: because of limitations in Western technology, many of the explorers were in considerable need of fresh supplies. When troubles arose at Tahiti, for example, Wallis did not leave because, to quote Robertson (1973:34), his "water was now very short and not near sufficiency to carry [him] to any known place." Polynesian appropriations could also undermine a ship's sailing capabilities. The taking of a quadrant at Tahiti, the attempted appropriation of a kedge anchor in the Marquesas, and the seizure of a cutter at Hawai'i all raised questions regarding Cook's ability to carry out his missions of exploration. Dening states the point well. (He makes it in regard to Cook, but we would extend it more broadly to other explorers.) "On a voyage his property was his limited capital. A sextant stolen was an irretrievable loss. His things—his nails, his beads, his handkerchiefs—had a present, monetary value. They were bartered for food and water. . . . He was transient. . . . His wealth lay in what he possessed, not in his distribution against tomorrow's needs and moral bonds" (Dening 1980:18).

Against this background it is easier to understand differential responses by explorers to Polynesian actions. Bougainville and Marchand were more tolerant of unsanctioned appropriations and displayed more restrained reactions to it. Both visited for relatively short periods: Bougainville stayed approximately twelve days at Tahiti; and Marchand nine at the Marquesas. In contrast, Wallis, Cook, and Dixon and Portlock stayed considerably longer and, correspondingly, were more distressed by the unsanctioned removal of goods. Staying briefly and replenishing supplies quickly, the former explorers were not as involved in long-term trade relations. The loss of goods was thus of less concern. The latter group, in contrast, needed to be concerned. The reason Cook impounded twenty-two canoes for the stealing of an iron rake at Tahiti—a case frequently cited as a Western overreaction to the loss of private property—was to set an example. Tahitians "were daily either commit-
ting or attempting to commit one theft or other” (Cook in Beaglehole 1955:101). With plans for a still longer stay, Cook perceived he might well lose far more if some action were not taken.

The explorers had a limited number of options available to them in coping with Polynesian attempts to appropriate their property. One option, chosen by several sea captains, was simply to tolerate the loss of material. During an exchange of presents between Marchand and a high status Marquesan, for example, the former’s handkerchief and snuff-box were taken. Marchand downplayed the incident “as he did not wish to disturb the joy of [the] day” (Fleurieu 1801:38). At Tahiti, Banks notes that he and Cook “had resolvd . . . rather to put up with our losses than frighten the Indians the consequences of which we knew to be scarcity of provisions” (Beaglehole 1962, 1:287). But this alternative was a limited one at best. Followed to any great extent, it meant the loss of valued goods and a reduced ability to trade.

A second option was to leave after a short stay. This is the alternative Bougainville chose at Tahiti. Cook, Ingraham, Hergest, and Marchand chose it at the Marquesas. Portlock and Dixon did the same at the island of Hawai‘i. Regarding his stay in the Marquesas, Cook observed that even with the killing of a thief, the Marquesans “would very often exercize their tallant of thieving upon us, which I thought necessary to put up with as our stay was likely to be short among them” (Beaglehole 1961:366). The obvious problem with this option was that it limited the ability to reprovision ships, to obtain the diet of fresh fruits, vegetables, and water thought necessary as antiscorbutics. It also raised problems of crew morale, since sailors frequently desired rest and recreation ashore. And it left open the question of where else they might go for reprovisioning. The problem of appropriation was common throughout the Pacific. Avoiding it at one island meant facing it at another.

A third option was violent retribution. But the blatant killing of Polynesians was, if we are to believe their journals, morally reprehensible to many sea captains of the period. They preferred less drastic steps, such as shooting off cannons (without shot) or killing birds—demonstrations of their weaponry that did not lead to the loss of human life. But since European weaponry was foreign in nature, the implications of such demonstrations were often missed by Polynesians. When La Pérouse attempted to show a Samoan chief the effectiveness of French firearms by killing some birds, we are told the chief concluded the weapons were mainly used for that purpose. Usually someone had to be killed before Polynesians understood the deadly implications of European weaponry.

We can infer a second, and equally important problem with the use of violence. It threatened to upset trade relations. Bougainville (1772:236), hearing some of his men had killed a Tahitian, stated. “I immediately went ashore with an assortment of silk stuffs, and tools
[which] I distributed among the chiefs, expressing my concern to them on account of the disaster which happened the day before, and assuring them that I would punish the perpetrators." And following the killing of a Tahitian for taking a musket, Cook wrote "we prevail'd on about 20 of them to come to the Tent and their sit down with us and endeavour'd by every means in our power to convince them that we still would be friends with them" (Beaglehole 1955:80).

Complicating the problems generated by violence was the fact that it usually required repeated application to be effective. Even after Polynesians had grasped the lethal character of Western weapons, they often continued their attempts to obtain shipboard property without permission. Threats of violence were sometimes effective, but they did not always solve the problem. Quoting Ingraham (1971:48), "a motion with a musket was sufficient to make [the Marquesans] all jump overboard. Yet in a little time they grew bolder, seeing we did not hurt them." Europeans thus confronted a dilemma. Violence, as a sole strategy for controlling the actions of Polynesians, required repeated displays. Yet violence was perceived as having definite moral and economic costs. Having to repeatedly kill the very people with whom they wished to trade was not a very practical solution to their problem.

The option that often proved most effective in controlling Polynesian appropriation over the long term was reliance on indigenous authorities. Chiefs not only supervised the orderliness of particular exchanges, but were also able to get missing property back. They often assumed such responsibilities unasked. A Mr. Boutin informed La Pérouse at Samoa that "since the chief had come on board, the islanders were much quieter and less insolent" (La Pérouse 1799, 2.132). During Cook's stay at Tahiti, Tupura'a i Tamaiti assisted in the return of stolen objects; Ereti (Reti) did the same for Bougainville during his visit (Bougainville 1772:223). And at Hawaii, particular chiefs were "of great use to us in preventing the Indians from thieving" (Samwell in Beaglehole 1967:1161).

But there was a problem here too. A variety of data suggest chiefs were often involved in the taking of Western property. Kalaniopu’u’s chiefs, King asserted at Hawai‘i, "have the vice of thieving if they are not always the principals they are suspect’d to be the aides & abettors" (Beaglehole 1967:515). At Tahiti, both Cook and Banks suspected Purea and Tutahah as "principals" in certain incidents. Boenechea commented that "thievishness was observed even in those of the highest ranks" (Corney 1913.333). No matter who took the items, moreover, they might well end up in the chiefs’ hands. Tahitian chiefs had a standing levy on various luxury items, Oliver (1974:1159) notes, including "most items of European origin, however incomprehensible or useless".
The example of the Hawaiian chief Palea illustrates the problem. During Cook's first visit to Kealakekua Bay, Palea was instrumental in keeping order on board ship. "We should have found it difficult to have kept [the Hawaiians] in order," Cook noted, "had not a chief named Parea [Palea] now and then [exerted] his authority" (in Beaglehole 1967:491). Law described one incident: "About 10 AM [on January 21] a Man Stole something out of the Ship which by some means or other was made known to Parea—who went in search of him when he found him the Man jumped into the Water & Parea after him they both stayed under Water for a Long time when Parea came up & said . . . the thief was Dead" (in Beaglehole 1967:509; see also Samwell in Beaglehole 1967:1161). But according to Samwell and others, Palea was also involved in the unsanctioned appropriation of British property. "It is pretty clear that [Palea] had set the Man to steal the Armourer's Tongues & Chizel & not improbable but that he was the Man who stole the Cutter" (Samwell in Beaglehole 1967:1207). What is intriguing about the theft of the armorer's tongs is that soon after they were stolen, Palea "sett off . . . for the shore promising to bring the things back." Still Samwell felt: "circumstances make it probable that this whole affair was occasioned by [Palea] . . . the whole Scheme had been concerted between him and his people" (in Beaglehole 1967:1193).

Why should the chiefs encourage the taking of shipboard property while protecting against it? To answer this question we must turn to Polynesian perspectives on these early encounters.10

**Polynesian Perspectives**

A number of anthropologists have asserted that the themes of status and status rivalry are pervasive in Polynesian society. Quoting Goldman: "In Polynesia, it is the status system—specifically, the principles of aristocracy—that gives direction to the social structure as a whole. Principles of status dominate all other principles of social organization" (Goldman 1970:7). And "rivalry is inherent in Polynesian status rules. From the standpoint of the status system, rivalry may be understood as a necessary response to ambiguity of rank" (Goldman 1970:24).

Data suggest that these themes pervaded Polynesian social relations in the past. Kirch (1985:307) asserts that: "the political history [of the Hawaiian archipelago] during the final two centuries prior to European intrusion, was one of constant attempts by ruling chiefs to extend their domains through conquest and annexation of lands." Oliver (1974:1076-1077) suggests that an important goal for Tahitians was "command over the services of as many other persons as feasible." A com-
mon cause of inter-district warfare in Samoa “was competition for the various supreme titles . . . the ascendancy of one family necessarily meant the military conquest and humiliation of the other” (Howe 1984:233-234). Even in the less hierarchical Marquesas, Dening (1980:234) records “there were many instances of domination.”

It is relevant to add that conflicts for power were often rather brutal affairs, even by European standards. Many wars, Ellis (1829, 2:494) observed, were “most merciless and destructive.” In Tahiti, the victors swept through the communities of the defeated—burning, pillaging, destroying gardens and groves and slaughtering everyone they could find. To illustrate the mood of the conquerors, infants were sometimes transfixed to their mothers, or pierced through the head and strung on cords; or, women were treated with various ‘indignities’ after which they were disemboweled and derisively displayed. And men were sometimes beaten flat with clubs and left to dogs and pigs, or lined up to serve as rollers for beaching or launching the victor’s canoes (Oliver 1974:398).

It is important to note that several accounts written by Europeans in the early postcontact period suggest that Polynesian concepts of appropriation were closely aligned to issues of status. These accounts leave little doubt that Hawaii, Tahiti, Samoa, and the Marquesas had concepts akin to the English term theft, and some meted out rather severe punishment for property violations. Our best information in this regard derives from Tahiti. Ellis stated that among Tahitians, “if detected, the thief experienced no mercy, but was often murdered on the spot. If detected afterwards, he was sometimes dreadfully wounded or killed” (Ellis 1829, 2:371). Banks commented that Tupia (Tupaia) “always insisted that Theft was punished with death and smaller crimes in proportion” (Beaglehole 1962, 1:386).

But it is important to stress the ambiguities regarding the application of these abstract pronouncements to specific cases. “By conventional Western standards,” Oliver notes, “the [Tahitian] attitude toward theft was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, a proven thief could usually be killed with impunity. Notwithstanding which, there appears to have existed a widely shared admiration for clever thievery, including some emulous veneration of Hiro, god of thievery” (Oliver 1974:1054). Whether a thief was ever punished, and if so how severely, seems to have depended on the statuses of the individuals involved, the items stolen, and the circumstances under which the thief was caught. The ultimate determinant of what punishment, if any, would be invoked for theft depended on the offended party’s ability to enforce a punishment. As Moerenhout (1837, 2:16-17) phrased it for Tahiti. “It was a case of
might makes right.” Or, according to Ellis (1829, 2:369), “the administration of justice was regulated more by the relative power and influence of the parties, than by the merits of their cause.”

If one accepts these data and the conclusions drawn from them, we can make considerable headway in understanding chiefly perspectives regarding the appropriation of shipboard property. Two interrelated factors seemingly were at work. First, the whole process of controlling theft played into the chiefs’ hands. It not only allowed them to display their authority to Western sea captains but to draw forth gifts of gratitude from them as well. With it, chiefs were rather important; sea captains found them invaluable aids in limiting the loss of goods. It thus appears that Western weaponry and Polynesian appropriation acted as counterweights to one another. The weapons affirmed Western technological superiority, and once aware of their destructive potential, Polynesians generally traded on terms favorable to Europeans. But Polynesian appropriations drew the explorers into reinforcing the status claims of local chiefs. Western sea captains paid Polynesian chiefs considerable attention and presented them with many gifts to gain their assistance.

Second, from a Polynesian perspective, the social status of the European visitors was ambiguous. As Pearson states, Europeans could be categorized as castaways, dependent on their Polynesian hosts for sustenance. Alternatively, they could be classed as “stranger-kings”—foreigners who had come to usurp chiefly power, as Sahlins (1985) insightfully notes. From this latter viewpoint, the visitors were not dependent on their hosts but were possible conquerors of them. Even if one does not accept Pearson’s and Sahlins’ speculations, one can reasonably conclude that Europeans initially held ambiguous positions in Polynesian hierarchies, if for no other reason than they lacked preassigned places.

Confronted with this ambiguity in rank, the literature suggests that many Polynesians at first took a cautious attitude toward Europeans, treating them with deference. But such hospitality did not necessarily signify that Polynesian chiefs actually acknowledged the Europeans as being of high status. Polynesian status principles, based on notions of efficacy (see Shore, chapter 5), required Westerners to demonstrate their potency through concrete actions. To achieve full recognition of high rank required, among other things, resisting the challenges of chiefs. Despite initial appearances to the contrary then, the status of Europeans was probably very much open to negotiation. The attempted seizure of shipboard goods can be seen as part of this negotiation process. It challenged the sea captains’ ability to command respect, to enforce behavior appropriate to individuals of high rank. In such circumstances, “might makes right” not only referred to issues of appropriation but to issues of status. Modern ethnographic accounts make
clear that property rights in Polynesia constitute a subset of rules governing interpersonal relations.

In this regard it is intriguing to observe Polynesian reactions to European violence during early encounters. The explorers' journals indicate that violent episodes rarely disturbed Polynesian interest in trade. On June 24, 1767, Wallis' cannonfire “struck such terror amongst the poor unhappy crowd [of Tahitians] that it would require the pen of Milton to describe” (Robertson 1973:41). Yet trade resumed the next day. At Vaitahu, Cook's men killed a Marquesan trying to appropriate an iron stanchion. But within two hours, Wales indicates, the Marquesans “had returned and trafficked as before” (Beaglehole 1961:829). Within two days of de Langle's death and the melee at Tutuila, Samoans came out to trade with La Pérouse. And within six days of the retribution meted out by the British after Cook’s death, Hawaiian canoes were coming out to the ships “in great numbers” (Samwell in Beaglehole 1967:1216). That Polynesians seemed willing to trade under such conditions suggests that European violence fit within the cultural parameters of their own expectations. According to Oliver (1974:1059), in Tahiti, “offenses against the position [or] property of a tribal chief resulted invariably in severe penalties, from temporary exile to death.” It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that Europeans, like chiefs, were expected to respond with violence to provocations and status challenges.

To state that issues of status and power were involved in these events is not to suggest that they were the exclusive concerns of Polynesians. Other factors were at work as well. As Turnbull (1813:282) phrased it, seizing goods was also “the cheapest and easiest method of purchase.” Particularly for commoners, who lacked a chief's ability to mobilize goods, appropriation constituted an alternative to trade. Still, to acknowledge that multiple factors were involved in Polynesian actions in regard to shipboard property is not to diminish the central role the negotiation of status probably played in the process, especially for chiefs.

If our analysis of Polynesian perspectives on the appropriation of European property is correct, we need to look again at explanations that attribute Polynesian “thievery” to differing conceptions of property. Such explanations place too much emphasis on the items taken, on Western property per se. It might be closer to the mark to view the tensions surrounding the appropriation of shipboard property as stemming from differing perceptions of what was being negotiated. Europeans saw goods as items of trade. They were negotiating for supplies. High status Polynesians may have been interested in Western goods, but equally important was the negotiation of status. Polynesians, and par-
ticularly Polynesian chiefs, had an interest in evaluating the potency of the newcomers, in placing them within a graded hierarchical structure according to indigenous principles. (Consistent with this perspective, many Western goods were valued as status symbols; chiefs used them to signify high position.)

**Toward a More Comparative Perspective: Patterns of Violence**

The value of comparative analysis in Polynesian ethnology is well established, as the works of Burrows (1939b), Goldman (1970), Kirch (1984a), Williamson (1924, 1933), and Sahlins (1958) illustrate. And yet, despite their recognized value, comparative studies are rare in the analysis of Polynesian-Western interaction. As noted above, Pacific historians have tended to narrow their focus to specialized topics on particular islands or, at best, to single archipelagoes. What we want to suggest in this section is the value of casting a broader net of analysis. We want to stress the importance of comparison for illuminating the general processes that patterned interaction, processes that gave form to specific events on particular islands. We do so by exploring the violent encounters that erupted between Polynesians and Europeans during the early period of contact.¹²

Various explanations have been offered for the violence that erupted between these two groups. Aggression on the part of Polynesians, Pearson (1970:121) suggests, could be precipitated by “the need to protect the population and resources of each island from the threat of depredations and diseases and from the inevitable drain on food supply that must accompany [a European] visit.” It could also derive from “European breaches of [Polynesian] protocol or of the terms on which their hosts understood [Europeans] to have been welcomed” (Pearson 1970:144). Explanations for European aggression often emphasize the attitudes held toward indigenous populations. Campbell asserts, for instance that “sailors’ attitudes to Polynesians during this time were fearful. These attitudes, allied to the callousness of the age, when applied to Polynesians amounted to an almost total disregard for local life and interests” (Campbell 1982:73).

Such explanations, while not without merit, raise as many questions as they answer. Take, for instance, Campbell’s claim that Europeans had a callous disregard for the lives of Polynesians. Enough evidence can be found in the explorers’ journals to require a clear qualification to the effect that many sea captains consciously exercised restraint over their men’s actions. Such blanket explanations also fail to account for why conflicts arose at certain times and places and not at others. And
although Pearson is probably correct in suggesting that European crews created problems for indigenous inhabitants of the islands, his analysis skims over the dynamics by which certain of those problems led to violence.

Approaching this issue within a comparative framework, one can perceive a general pattern to the violence at Tahiti, Samoa, and Hawaii. Following first contact, Europeans initiated trade with Polynesians. During the exchanges that followed, Polynesians attempted to appropriate a number of articles from aboard ship. Initial European reactions were restrained, the attempts at appropriation were met with threats and harmless displays of weaponry. When Polynesians failed to grasp the implied threats, a Polynesian might be killed. (At Hawaii a chief was slain, at Tahiti a person of unknown status; no one was killed during this stage at Samoa.) Following this initial European assault, within hours in some instances, days in others, the Polynesians attacked in force. Such attacks brought forth large-scale European violence, resulting in the deaths of numerous Polynesians. Violence then subsided and trade resumed.

To do a detailed analysis of each case is beyond the scope of this chapter, especially given the voluminous nature of the literature. But let us outline the main points, beginning with Tahiti.

**Tahiti**

As the fog cleared on June 19, 1768, the British ship *Dolphin*, commanded by Wallis, was approached by “upwards of a hundred and fifty canoes” (Robertson 1973:21; see also Hawkesworth 1775.39). The British, sick (presumably from scurvy) and seriously short of water, drew Tahitians into trading. When some Tahitians refused to leave the ship without obtaining iron, and others in canoes became “a Little surly,” the British fired a nine-pound shot over their heads. This seems to have had “the desired Effect” of frightening them (Robertson 1973:22). It is worth describing the first recorded seizure of shipboard property. “One of the [Tahitians] was standing close by one of our young Gentlemen, Henry Ibbot, who wore a Gold Laced Hat. This Glaring Hat attracted the fellow's fancy, and he snatched it off and Jumped overboard with it in his hand. When he got about twenty yards from the ship, he held up the Hat and wore it round his Head. We called to him and pointed muskets at him, but he took no notice of the muskets not knowing their use” (Robertson 1973:22; cf. Hawkesworth 1775:40).

In the face of (what the British viewed as) provocations, including, of course, the unsanctioned appropriation of their property, the British displayed restraint. An event on June 21 is typical. Tahitians in canoes tried to board a British barge and “run aboard” of the cutter, carrying
Robertson then ordered the Marines to point the muskets at them, but they Laughed at us” he noted, “and one struck [the prow of his canoe] into [the] Boat’s stern.” Robertson, finding “them so very resolute” and believing himself “under the necessity of using violent means,” ordered two of the crew to wound the “most resolute fellows” (Robertson 1973:30–31). But the crew were imperfect in their aim, killing one Tahitian and wounding another. Trading (and Polynesian appropriation of European property) continued on a regular basis over the next two days. On June 24, about 300 canoes with approximately 4,000 men—under the guise of trading—attacked the Dolphin, throwing stones on her deck (Robertson 1973:40–41). Initially British sentries responded by firing among the canoes. But this had little effect. When the British “found lenity would not do,” grapeshot from the ship’s cannons were fired into the midst of the Tahitians, causing considerable destruction and terror The Tahitians returned to trade on the following day. On June 26 the British, fearing that the massing of Tahitians on shore presaged another attack, fired a “few round and Grape shot” among them (Robertson 1973:52). Trade was reestablished on June 27. Relations between the two groups during the rest of Wallis’ stay were quite amicable. Although there were occasional incidents of violence during the subsequent visits of Bougainville, Cook, and Boenechea, where Europeans killed a small number of Tahitians, there was none of the formally organized violence of June 24, 1768, by either side. Friendly relations prevailed between the two groups.

**Samoa**

The first direct European contact with Samoans at Tutuila occurred on December 8, 1787, when La Pérouse met canoes about three leagues out at sea. Trading began immediately. It continued over the next two days as La Pérouse sailed near shore and finally anchored off the island. On December 10, “a hundred canoes” came round La Pérouse’s two ships and bartered various provisions for glass beads (La Pérouse 1799, 2:128). Confusion over trading ashore on December 10 was set right by “some Indians, whom [the French] took for chiefs” (La Pérouse 1799, 2:129). On board La Pérouse’s ship a “chief” likewise seemed to keep order. La Pérouse commented (1799, 2:132), “I made this chief many presents.”

When a Samoan in “an absolute act of hostility” attacked a French sailor with a mallet, La Pérouse, to avoid shedding blood, had four strong sailors take the Samoan and throw him in the water. La Pérouse added. “Perhaps a little severity would have been proper by way of example, to awe these people, and render them sensible of the superior-
ity our arms gave us over their personal strength, for their stature being about five feet ten inches high, their muscular limbs, and Herculean form, gave them such an idea of their superiority, as rendered us little formidable in their eyes" (La Pérouse 1799, 2:129-130). Later, "wishing . . . to impress [a Samoan chief] with a high opinion of our strength," La Pérouse "ordered different trials of the use of our arms to be exhibited before him, but their effect made little impression on him, and he appeared to me, to think them fit only for killing birds" (La Pérouse 1799, 2:132).

It was in this context that de Langle went ashore for additional supplies of fresh water on December 11 in order to treat the scurvy afflicting his crew. Following a misunderstanding, the nature of which is not clear, de Langle and eleven other Frenchmen were killed by the Samoans.

Differing explanations of the massacre have been offered by Samoan and French commentators. The Samoan explanation—at least the one we have on record—focuses on "the indignity offered to one of [the Samoan] chiefs" (Oceanus 1814:381), in other words a matter of status. The French explanation focuses on de Langle's humane character. La Pérouse commented: de Langle's "humanity . . . occasioned his death. Had he but allowed himself to fire on the first Indians who entered into the water to surround the boats, he would have prevented his own death" as well as that of the others (La Pérouse 1799, 2:140).

To La Pérouse's astonishment, the next day five or six Samoan canoes came out to trade with the French. Full of supplies, La Pérouse brushed them off, firing a cannon near the canoes to splash but not actually harm the occupants. (He considered it unfair to kill them when he had no proof they had participated in the previous killings.) La Pérouse then left.

The next vessel to stop at Tutuila appears to have been the Pandora (Gilson 1970:67). The Pandora's tender repulsed a Samoan night attack on June 22, 1791, causing "terrible havoc" and the death of several Samoans (Edwards and Hamilton 1915:12). Following this conflict and, we presume, a much better appreciation among Samoans of the lethal capabilities of Western weaponry, trade relations took on a more positive tone. George Bass, the next European to trade at the island, described the Samoans as "friendly and receptive" (Gilson 1970:67, see also Bowden 1952:112).

**Hawaii**

During Cook's second visit to the Hawaiian Islands, he became the first known European to make contact with the inhabitants dwelling in the southern portion of the archipelago. The British learned that their
earlier visit to Kaua‘i, and their killing of a Hawaiian there, were known to the inhabitants. On November 27 trade flourished. A paramount chief, Kahekili, visited Cook on board ship and Cook commented, “I did not hear they attempted to steal any one thing” (in Beaglehole 1967:475). Even a black cat that fell overboard was returned. On November 30, Kalaniopu‘u, another paramount chief and Kahekili’s opponent, visited Cook off the eastern side of Maui. Circumnavigating the island of Hawai‘i from December 1 to January 15, Cook quite successfully traded for food. Again, there were few problems with Hawaiians taking shipboard property.

As Cook approached Kealakekua Bay on Hawai‘i on January 16, 1779, an estimated thousand canoes came out to the British ships. Trade flourished, but the appropriation of shipboard property became a problem. To quote Law, “they began today to make use of their fingers too freely” (in Beaglehole 1967:490). A boat’s rudder and even Cook’s keys were taken. Cook’s response was to have a few muskets and “Great guns” fired off “in order to shew the Chiefs the effect of them & to what distance they would carry.” Samwell stated that the Hawaiians were “much astonished” (Samwell in Beaglehole 1967:1158). But Cook commented that they seemed “more surprised than frightened” (in Beaglehole 1967:490).

On anchoring at Kealakekua Bay, unsanctioned appropriation by Hawaiians was brought under control by various Hawaiian chiefs, including Palea. One of the chiefs even retrieved Cook’s keys. Cook went ashore on January 17 Hawaiians prostrated themselves before him (Samwell in Beaglehole 1967 1159). Called Lono, a Hawaiian deity, Cook participated two days later in a religious ceremony at a Hawaiian heiau ‘shrine’ Samwell stated that Cook “was invested with the Title and Dignity of Orono [Lono] a Character that is looked upon by [the Hawaiians] as partaking something of divinity” (in Beaglehole 1967:1161–1162). Though some items continued to disappear from aboard ship the British were not disturbed. Matters were well in hand, controlled as they were by the chiefs. The British, moreover, found themselves well supplied with gifts of food.

The British left Kealakekua Bay on February 4. Following damage to the Resolution in a gale off Maui, however, they returned on February 10 for repairs. On February 13, when “a great number of large canoes arrived in the Bay” (Samwell in Beaglehole 1967:1191) the British began effective reprovisioning of their ships, though this time food was mostly obtained through trade rather than gifts. Unsanctioned appropriation by Hawaiians of shipboard property became a serious problem. Clerke noted that “every day produc’d more numerous and more audacious depredations” (in Beaglehole 1967:531–532). On February 14, following the loss of a British cutter (to Palea?) the previous night, the British blockaded the bay and Cook went ashore to take Kala-
niopu’u, the paramount chief of the island, hostage, pending the safe return of the cutter. Cook’s plan proved unsuccessful. A large Hawaiian crowd gathered as Cook, Kalaniopu’u, and some British marines stood on the beach. News arrived that a chief trying to leave the bay had been killed by the British. In response to a threatening gesture, Cook fired a round of small shot at an individual. The Hawaiian escaped unharmed, being protected by a mat. Still, the crowd was aroused. Violence followed on both sides. The Hawaiians made a “general attack” (Phillips in Beaglehole 1967:535) that the British were unable to fend off effectively, and Cook was killed. As Samwell later commented, the Hawaiians “were totally unacquainted with the Effect of fire arms, they thought their Matts would defend them & in the heat & fury of Action they were not immediately convinced of the contrary” (in Beaglehole 1967:1202). In retaliation for the Hawaiian attack and especially Cook’s death, the British killed a number of Hawaiians. After a four-day hiatus, trade was reestablished. By February 20, Hawaiians were coming out to the ships in great numbers. Samwell commented: “They tell us that they are all sorry for what has happened” and wished to reestablish ties of friendship (in Beaglehole 1967:1217). According to Clerke, in the final days before the British departure on February 23, the Hawaiians acted “with the utmost justice and honesty” (Beaglehole 1967.549). This was the extent of Hawaiian-European conflict during the early contact period in Hawaii. There was no further violence during the three subsequent European visits to the area by Portlock and Dixon in 1786 and 1786-1787, and La Pérouse in 1786.

Obviously one must be cautious about forcing these data into a formal structure. One perceives more of a trend than a fixed sequence of stages. But a pattern emerges nonetheless, despite differences in detail. It can be expressed as trading, with, over time, increasing unsanctioned Polynesian appropriation of shipboard property, followed by violence, followed by renewed trading (with, over the short term at least, diminished violence). Seen from a comparative perspective, violence was thus not a random event. It was a regular step in the development of trade relations. It tended to occur at certain times and not at others.

**Why Did Violence Occur?**

Assigning responsibility for the violence was, and still is, a Western preoccupation. Were the Europeans culpable by using firearms too vigorously to protect their property? It does seem clear that in many instances they initiated the violence. Or were Polynesian actions sufficiently provocative and life-threatening to warrant extreme measures? There certainly seem to be indications that in many instances they were, or at least appeared so from a European perspective.

The question of Cook’s death has been a particular focus for specula-
La Pérouse assigns responsibility to the English for initiating hostilities, and suggests that Cook’s imprudence “compelled the inhabitants of Owyhee [Hawai’i] to have recourse to a just and necessary defence” (La Pérouse 1799, 1.346). Or was Cook’s death the result of his own humane values, his unwillingness to use violence except as a last resort? Williamson, one of Cook’s officers, implies as much in his comment that, “these barbarians must first be quelled by force, as they afterwards readily believe that whatever kindness is then shewn them proceeds from love, whereas otherwise they attribute it to weakness, or cowardice, & presents only increase their insolence” (in Beaglehole 1967:1349). Samwell stated the matter more simply: “for after all that may be said in favour of these or any other Indians, it is still certain that their good behaviour to us proceeds in great measure from fear” (in Beaglehole 1967:1219).

The issue so put is unresolvable. Too much is unknowable, including the intentions and attitudes of the main actors involved. And even if precise data were available, such events are too complex to assign simple notions of causality. But we can come to understand the dynamics that repeatedly precipitated violence in those early encounters between Europeans and Polynesians.

Given the character of the cultures involved, and the nature of the encounters, we ought not be surprised by the frequency of violence. The meetings were of a political nature for both parties, and both sides were familiar with violence as a political instrument. There is little doubt that, despite a commitment to civilized action, most sea captains were prepared to use force to achieve their ends when necessary. European sea captains presumably saw themselves as so vastly superior technologically that they possessed the luxury of restraint. They did not anticipate being seriously challenged. But on the high islands of Polynesia, notwithstanding the tradition of hospitality shown to guests, political challenge was a way of life, and warfare was endemic. From this perspective violence was almost an inevitable part of the developing relations between the two groups.

The Marquesas

One of the great values of comparative studies is that they help pinpoint anomalies. Exceptions to patterns often raise critical questions otherwise ignored. We take as an example the encounters between Europeans and Marquesans at Vaitahu Bay on Tahuata. The process of establishing stable relations there appears to have been at variance with the pattern described above.

Cook arrived on April 8, 1774, and soon began trading. The next
day, when Marquesan attempts to appropriate shipboard property became a problem, a "thief" was "accidentally" killed by musket fire. (Cook commanded the officer to fire over the culprit's canoe but the officer misinterpreted Cook's order.) When the British demonstrated to other Marquesans, who were trying to appropriate the kedge anchor, how far musket balls traveled by shooting over their heads, the islanders immediately seem to have grasped the point and left the anchor alone. No other violence occurred during Cook's visit, nor did any erupt during the subsequent visits of Ingraham, Marchand, and Hergest. That one killing constituted the total violence between the Marquesans and the Europeans is suspicious; so is the fact that Marquesans so readily perceived the lethal implications of Western weaponry. The behavior of Marquesans toward Ingraham, Marchand, and Hergest parallels that of Tahitians toward Bougainville, Cook, and Boenechea: there was apparent recognition of Western superiority in weaponry and few audacious attempts to seize goods from aboard ship. Why was violence so muted in this instance? The reason, we suspect, derives from Mendana's earlier visit to the bay in 1595. Though Mendana's visit took place several generations earlier, one wonders if Marquesans retained some knowledge of European weaponry, and of the perhaps 200 people killed by the Spaniards.

The violence at Vaitahu in 1595 raises a related question. Why was there so much Spanish violence when there appears, from Quiros' journal, to have been so little Marquesan provocation? The data suggest that at least two factors were at variance with the pattern at Tahiti, Hawaii, and Samoa. First, Mendana was not short of supplies on his arrival at Vaitahu. He had left Peru little more than a month before with four modestly supplied ships. It was only Quiros' concern with the uncertainties of the voyage ahead that caused Mendana to take on water there. Having little need for trade, the Spaniards apparently were less concerned with remaining on good terms with the indigenous inhabitants. When eleven Marquesans approached the ship, rather than trade, the Spaniards fired on them, killing five.

Second, Mendana either did not share the Enlightenment concern for restraint displayed by later sea captains, or he was unable to control his soldiers, who lacked such ideals. Quiros (1904:2C) states in his journal: "It may be held as certain that two hundred natives were killed in these islands [by the] impious and inconsiderate soldiers." Given this background, the small amount of violence during Cook's visit may have acted more as a reminder than a first lesson about the deadly nature of European weaponry.

The general point we want to stress is that comparative analysis is an important, indeed crucial, tool for understanding the dynamics of Polynesian-Western interactions. The myopic view of focusing on only one
island or one point in time misses much of the context that framed the encounters. Comparative analysis not only illuminates these broader contexts, it allows us to see specific cases in perspective.

Summary

In this chapter we have critically reviewed historical and anthropological approaches to the study of early Polynesian-Western interactions. Although impressed by the wealth of literature on the topic, we have noted significant problems. In regard to Pacific history we commented on three: (1) the accounts remain focused on European perspectives; (2) they often reflect a limited theoretical vision, and (3) they suffer from a lack of comparative analysis. As a result, historians of the Pacific have had difficulty in charting new directions, in developing Davidson’s vision of island-centered histories. Anthropologists have also had problems. They have been caught between a concern for broad syntheses and the need to support generalizations with detailed data. The cautious approach, exemplified by Oliver, focuses on the ethnographic materials, and on presenting them in a cogent, organized manner. The usual criticism voiced here is that the approach lacks theoretical vision. Valeri’s work on Hawaii exemplifies the opposite perspective. He offers an interpretive program based upon strong theoretical assumptions. The problem with this approach is its tendency to overinterpret primary materials, to fit facts to predetermined forms.

Ambiguities in the documentary data exacerbate these problems, and although the sheer amount of literature is impressive, it contains significant biases. The accounts, for instance, were usually written from a European perspective; they often depict Polynesian societies in static terms, ignoring internal diversity and social dynamics.

In an effort to provide directions for future research, we have suggested three strategies for interpreting the data on early interactions between Europeans and Polynesians: (1) the development of a stronger dialogue between presentist and reconstructionist approaches, so that each informs the other (our reliance on cultural notions of status and status rivalry to account for Polynesian actions is an example of this strategy); (2) a focus on the sequence of interactions at specific localities, as opposed to treating each episode by itself; and (3) the use of controlled comparisons to highlight regularities in these sequences.

In the process of illustrating our perspective we offered new interpretations of issues that have preoccupied students of the early contact period. We were led to question the suitability of such concepts as theft to describe Polynesian actions, since they carry semantic loadings in English that are problematic. We suggested that such actions were a
part of a negotiating process. European sea captains sought to optimize the conditions of trade and to affirm a particular self-image of themselves as "civilized." Polynesians focused on the interpersonal implications of property disposition. For high-ranking Polynesians, appropriating shipboard goods also involved the issue of status, especially vis-à-vis Europeans. The role of chiefs was central, we suggested, both because the Europeans saw them as a means of controlling unsanctioned appropriation, and because the chiefs found status advantages associated with the monitoring of trade. It is unlikely we will ever fully know what precisely motivated the various individuals involved to behave as they did. But what we have sought to sketch out are the contexts within which these individuals operated and which gave their actions meaning.

In exploring the value of comparative analyses we focused on the issue of violence. We observed a general pattern to the development of violence at Tahiti, Samoa, and Hawaii, and described it in terms of a sequence: trading, with, over time, increasing unsanctioned Polynesian appropriation of shipboard property, followed by violence, followed by renewed trading (with, over the short term at least, diminished violence). With this as background, we explored the case of the Marquesas, which seemingly deviated from this model, and found it to be an important case for clarifying certain points.

Our concern in this chapter has been to suggest new possibilities for examining old issues. Scholars such as Davidson, Dening, Maude, Oliver, Sahlins, and Valeri have pointed the way; they have shown the possibilities the voluminous materials present to scholars bold enough to seize the challenge. Our chapter constitutes part of this continuing discourse. It is another statement in an ongoing conversation about the patterns of early Polynesian-Western interaction. And it is another sentence in a modern conversation about how to effectively study these patterns.

NOTES

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1 For additional references on topics covered in this section regarding the nature of the source material, see in respect to (1) its voluminous nature: Dening 1966:25, Howe 1984:44, and Spate 1977:222; (2) the European governments' concern with expanding both knowledge and national commerce (as


3. The concern with less formal agents fits into a broader trend of Western history in regard to paying increased attention to non-elites. As Sahlins (1985:32-33, 53-54) points out, it parallels changes within our own society.

4. For an interesting parallel regarding the over-emphasized passivity of indigenous populations, see DeVoto's comments (in J Howard 1952:8-9) regarding the role depicted for American Indians in United States history.

5. A reading of Hexter (1972:482-498) suggests interesting parallels between the island-centered approach's rise to prominence in Pacific history and the rise of the French Annales School to prominence in European history.


7. Rather than rely on secondary sources to inform our argument, we prefer to follow in the footsteps of Oliver, Dening, and Sahlins and rely on primary resources. As Oliver (1974:xi) notes in explaining how he came to write Ancient Tahitian Society: “many of the generalizations [previously] current about Tahitian social relations . were in reality scholars' inventions that had come to acquire 'authenticity' more through reassertion than through retesting with primary sources.” It is because of our concern for stressing the importance of pri-
mary sources that we provide extensive footnotes regarding the material con­sulted in our analyses. The footnotes are only partial renderings of a much larger set of materials. Our purpose in providing these listings, cumbersome as it may be, is to inform readers of the documentary foundations for our arguments.

8. Regarding the documentary sources on these visits, see in respect to (1) the Marquesas: Mendaña in 1595 (Quiros 1904), Cook in 1774 (Beaglehole 1961), Ingraham in 1791 (Ingraham 1971), Marchand in 1791 (Fleurieu 1801), and Hergest in 1792 (Vancouver 1798); (2) Tahiti: Wallis in 1767 (Robertson 1973; Hawkesworth 1775), Bougainville in 1768 (Bougainville 1772), Cook in 1769 (Beaglehole 1955, 1962), and Boenechea in 1772 (Corney 1913, 1915); (3) Hawaii: Cook in 1778 (Beaglehole 1967, Ellis 1782), Cook (and Clerke) in 1778–1779 (Beaglehole 1967; Ellis 1782), Portlock and Dixon in 1786 (Portlock 1789; Dixon 1789; Nicol 1822), La Pérouse in 1786 (La Pérouse 1799), and Portlock and Dixon in 1786–1787 (Portlock 1789; Dixon 1789; Nicol 1822); and (4) Samoa: Roggeveen in 1722 (Roggeveen 1970), Bougainville in 1768 (Bougainville 1772), La Pérouse in 1787 (La Pérouse 1799; Oceanus 1814), the HMS Pandora's tender in 1791 (Edwards and Hamilton 1915), and Bass in 1802 (Bowden 1952).


11 One possible reason for the severe punishments surrounding theft was that chiefs also had their property stolen. According to Cook, “It is not always in the power of the chiefs to prevent robberies, they are frequently robbed themselves and complain of it as a great evil” (Beaglehole 1967:222). In an important sense, such thefts constituted challenges to the chiefs’ status just as they did to that of the Western captains.


13. For details regarding Cook's first visit to the Hawaiian Islands, specifically to Kaua'i and Ni'ihau, see Cook in Beaglehole 1967:263–286 and Samwell in Beaglehole 1967 1081–1086.