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PERHAPS NO SINGLE CONCERN is more central to the study of social structure than the analysis of interpersonal relations. Indeed, although some scholars have chosen to emphasize other aspects of the socio-cultural order in discussing social structure (e.g., group alignment), the majority of anthropologists have defined the concept in terms of interpersonal relations or a derivative concept, such as "role relations". Radcliffe-Brown, for example, asserted that social structure is "an arrangement of persons in relationships institutionally defined and regulated" (1950:82).² Variations on this basic theme have been provided by theorists as diverse in viewpoint as Nadel, who states that "We arrive at the structure of a society through abstracting from the concrete population and its behavior the pattern or network (or 'system') of relationship 'between actors in their capacity of playing roles relative to one another'" (1957:12), and Oliver, for whom a structural description of a society concerns "interactions within and among its component groups as expressed in *dimensional terms*" (1958: 802, author's italics). Despite this centrality of interpersonal relations for social theory, however, anthropologists, with a few notable exceptions, have paid remarkably little attention to the conceptual and methodological problems involved in describing and measuring them. In this paper I suggest a conceptual framework and set of ethnographic methods for dealing with interpersonal relations in a structural way. Before doing this I describe my assumptions and elaborate a set of five criteria by which I propose my efforts be judged.

I

As a basic assumption, I subscribe to the general ethnographic postulate pro-

1 The conceptual framework presented in this paper has been adapted from my doctoral dissertation (Howard 1962), and was developed initially while I was doing field work in Rotuma. I would like to have used data from Rotuma to illustrate my case, but it was only after I had left the field that I reached a formulation that satisfied me. By that time the gaps in the field data were obvious, and it was apparent that a subsequent study would be necessary to provide the essential information. I have therefore decided to use a hypothetical case for illustration. I would like to acknowledge the stimulation and criticisms of my thesis advisors, Bernard J. Siegel and A. Kimball Romney. Irwin Howard and George Grace also made several useful suggestions after reading a first draft of this paper, and I gratefully acknowledge their assistance.

2 Radcliffe-Brown was not always consistent in his definition of structure. In a later publication he defines structure somewhat differently, then considering it to consist of human beings occupying positions in a structural arrangement (1952:9-10).

posed by Goodenough (1951, 1957)—that the goal of ethnographic description is to arrive at a formulation of what one would have to know in order to act in a culturally appropriate manner in given social circumstances. I have described elsewhere what I regard as the implications of this approach for social structure (Howard 1963) and for convenience quote the relevant section here:

Instead of conceiving of a society as having a social structure, I would suggest we conceive of social behavior as being structured by participation in given activities within which behavioral choices (decisions) are regular and predictable. Our "systems" would then best be regarded as *activity systems*, the relevant units being the principles (or, methodologically, factors) that are predictive of choice among behavioral alternatives.

How, then, shall we define the concept of social structure or, as I would have it, the structure of an activity system? First, it is evident that, if consistency is to be maintained, one criterion that must be met is that any definition be congruent with the notion of human behavior as decision-making. Taking this into account, I would suggest that the structure of an activity system be defined as a set of inter-related principles by which the participants performing an activity (or series of activities) determine who shall make decisions (or be held responsible for them) on issues that implicate all, or a part, of the group (two or more participants).

To develop comprehensive models of decision-making behavior we need to go further. Namely, we must specify the principles by which the persons selected by structural rules actually make decisions. To the extent that these are cognitively shared I would choose to call them *cultural principles* (p. 410).

In developing the framework for analyzing social interaction presented in this paper, the following criteria have been derived as relevant to these assumptions:

1. The analysis should produce sufficient information to permit the construction of decision-making models in the area of interpersonal relations. This involves three aspects, or types of information, for any given ego when acting toward alter. He must know (a) the definition of the social context (i.e., activity system), (b) who alter is, in socially relevant terms, and (c) how he can appropriately behave toward alter.
2. The resulting description should be "emic" i.e., it should exclude irrelevant data and describe only decision-making principles which are "essential" (as opposed to "accidental" in the linguistic sense).³

3 I am aware that this statement is an oversimplification of the "emic" concept as it applies in structural linguistics. The distinction between "essential" and "accidental" features is nevertheless conceptually significant, and can be considered an analytical ideal, even though in practice it may not always be possible to distinguish them unambiguously.

3. The conceptual scheme should be "systematic" i.e., it should be logically consistent and should reflect determinate relationships between the events (phenomena) being described.
4. The resulting description should be capable of validation. A corollary of this is that the account should describe observable events (operationally recordable phenomena). More specifically, meaning must be eliminated (i.e., abstracted out), and inferences regarding the nature of the phenomena restricted to a minimum.
5. The concepts should be applicable to any social group, whether static or changing, Western or non-Western, rural or urban, formal or informal.

II

The structural analysis of an activity system can be conceived to consist of three operations:

1. Deriving the *classes* of participants.
2. Making explicit the *essential significata* that are determinate for the rules of relationship between the classes.
3. Making explicit the *rules of relationship* between the classes of participants.

Let us take each of these operations separately.

1. A class of participants consists of either (a) a group of individuals whose relationship with one another within the context of a particular activity system is unstructured, i.e., no one individual within the group (or grouping) makes decisions for any other member of the group, all of whom have the same structural relations with each other class in the system; or (b) a single individual whose relationship with every other person in the system is structured, i.e., involves subordination or superordination of decision-making. In most cases a class can be expected to coincide with a recognized (linguistically designated) status, but not necessarily. In some instances it may be necessary for the investigator to derive classes from his observations of the way people behave, though they may be only vaguely aware of the classificatory distinctions they are apparently making.

2. The *essential significata* can be conceived as principles, or defining characteristics of classes of participants, that are determinate for the way classes of participants behave toward one another; or more explicitly, that affect the subordination or superordination of decision-making between classes.

3. *Rules of relationship* can be defined in terms of subordination or super-

ordination of decision-making between classes of participants in an activity system. Although such a definition may seem relatively simple at first glance, applying it to empirical data involves many complications. For example, how do we define and distinguish decision-making behavior between classes? How can we distinguish subordination and superordination? The solution of these problems was the most difficult, and most crucial, task in working out the current framework. Only after considerable experimentation was a conceptual scheme devised which appeared to be satisfactory for the purpose. It is based upon two polar concepts: *restraint* and *license*. By *restraint* is indicated the reluctance of an individual to make decisions implicating another person, or class of persons. By *license* is indicated the willingness of an individual to make decisions which implicate another person, or class of persons, and to exercise his own desires in his intercourse with them.

Two significant dimensions of the restraint—license continuum can be identified. These are (a) the degree of generality or specificity, and (b) intensity. A person can be said to be exercising generalized license over another person, or class of persons, to the extent that his decision-making priority extends over all possible behavioral domains. For example, the behavioral license which parents exercise over children in most societies is generalized, as it includes decision-making priority in all forms of activity and regarding anything of mutual interest to them. The decision-making license which a doctor exercises over his patients is more limited in scope, although in certain areas it may be considerable. A prerequisite to determining generality of decision-making license in any given relationship involves "mapping" the cognitive domain pertaining to interpersonal decision-making in the group under investigation. This means ascertaining the categorical distinctions that subjects make regarding those aspects of interpersonal relations people make decisions about. In my own investigations among the Rotumans, I found it possible to distinguish three major categories, which I suspect may have universal applicability and hence would be useful for cross-cultural comparisons.⁴ These were:

- (1) *License over activity*, which refers to the willingness of an individual to direct the activity of another person, or class of persons.⁵

⁴ For the background of this research cf. Howard 1962, 1963.

⁵ *Activity*, as a component feature of interpersonal relations, should be distinguished from *activity system*. The former simply refers to the human capacity for purposeful behavior; the latter to a set of goal-oriented actions involving two or more persons, in which a particular set of cultural and structural principles operate, such that behavioral decisions achieve a high meas-

(2) *License over property*, which refers to the willingness of an individual to determine the disposition of an article of property "owned" by another person, or class of persons.⁶

(3) *License over integrity*, which refers to the willingness of an individual to attack the personal dignity of another person, or class of persons.

The intensity scale can be conceived to range, theoretically, from extreme restraint to extreme license. Here, too, the distinctions must be consistent with the cognitive map of the subjects, but a useful set of criteria can be postulated as defining fixed points on the scale, against which cross-cultural comparisons can be made. Five such points can be distinguished:

(1) *Extreme restraint*, which involves total abstinence from the exercise of personal will.

(2) *Moderate restraint*, in which the expression of personal will is limited to following a culturally prescribed set of behavioral rules.

(3) *Conditional license*, in which the expression of personal will is limited by the actor's ability to provide adequate justification in culturally acceptable terms.

(4) *Moderate license*, in which the expression of personal will is limited by the will of the person, or class of persons, acted toward.

(5) *Extreme license*, in which the expression of personal will is unrestrained.

For simplicity, let us assume that we are investigating a cultural group whose cognitive map in the area of interpersonal relations corresponds exactly to the distinctions we have specified. The map would comprise a classificatory system containing fifteen categories, which might be defined as follows:

I. Activity

(1) extreme restraint, involving ego's complete abstinence from directing alter's activity.

(2) moderate restraint, involving requests that alter do something, but only when formal compensation or reciprocation is directly implied.

(3) conditional license, involving requests that alter do something without formal compensation or reciprocation, but with culturally acceptable legitimizing reasons being offered.

ure of predictability (both for the participants and the perceptive investigator). The scope of an activity system, both in time and space, may be variable; the fundamental criterion is the (inferred) existence of a determinate decision-making model that accounts for *all* interpersonal behavior (i.e., implicating property, integrity and activity).

6 The concept of "ownership" used here refers to license based upon legitimate socio-cultural principles, cf. pp. 274-277.

- (4) moderate license, involving requests that alter do something without formal compensation, reciprocation, or legitimizing reasons.
- (5) extreme license, involving ordering alter to do something without formal compensation, reciprocation, or legitimizing reasons.

II. *Property*

- (1) extreme restraint, involving ego's complete abstinence from using alter's property.
- (2) moderate restraint, involving acquisition of alter's property through request, but only when formal compensation or reciprocation is directly implied.
- (3) conditional license, involving acquisition of alter's property through request, without formal compensation or reciprocation, but with culturally acceptable legitimizing reasons being offered.
- (4) moderate license, involving acquisition of alter's property through request, without formal compensation, reciprocation, or legitimizing reasons.
- (5) extreme license, involving acquisition of alter's property without request, formal compensation, reciprocation, or legitimizing reasons.

III. *Integrity*

- (1) extreme restraint, involving ego's complete abstinence from verbal or physical approaches to alter, except during ceremonial interaction in which both the form and content of ego's behavior is prescribed, leaving no room for personal variation.
- (2) moderate restraint, involving restraint upon verbal or physical approaches to alter, such that the form of ego's behavior, but not the content, is prescribed (as in formal etiquette).
- (3) conditional license, involving ego's approaching alter verbally or physically, being restrained in so far as attacks upon alter's dignity occur only after provocation.
- (4) moderate license, involving ego's approaching alter verbally or physically, being restrained in attacks on alter's dignity only by the limits set by alter.
- (5) extreme license, involving ego's approaching alter verbally or physically, being unrestrained in attacks upon alter's dignity.

We could represent these categories in the following table:

	Activity	Property	Integrity
extreme restraint	A (1)	P (1)	I (1)
moderate restraint	A (2)	P (2)	I (2)
conditional license	A (3)	P (3)	I (3)
moderate license	A (4)	P (4)	I (4)
extreme license	A (5)	P (5)	I (5)

This is only a hypothetical case. In mapping the domains for a real group it would be necessary to define the categories so that they are consistent with the distinctions made by our subjects. For example, suppose that the group under investigation distinguishes between two kinds of activity, sexual and non-sexual, and that the rules governing license in each area vary independently (i.e., the same significata permit different degrees of license in each area; for example, a brother may own extreme license over his sister's non-sexual activity, but must exercise extreme restraint in the sexual area). Furthermore, assume that in the sexual area there is a categorical elaboration along the intensity scale, so that there are seven, rather than five, categories. A table representing the situation (in the domain of activity only) might be as follows:

	Activity	
	non-sexual	sexual
extreme restraint	An (1)	As (1)
moderate restraint	An (2)	
		As (2)
conditional license	An (3)	
		As (3)
moderate license	An (4)	As (4)
		As (5)
		As (6)
extreme license	An (5)	As (7)

This would indicate not only that there is an elaboration of categorization in the area of sexual activity, but also that this elaboration occurs toward the license end of the scale.

It is theoretically possible for categorical elaboration to be extremely extensive, and hence unwieldy, but practically speaking, it is unlikely to be the case. Many of the terminological distinctions that people make, for example, between

kinds of property, will not be significant for our purposes, since the same rules of relationship will apply to them, making them structural equivalents. Thus, if a given set of significata determines a degree of license (N) for both Pa and Pb, then $Pa=Pb$. Only when the same significata determine different degrees of license is it necessary to make a categorical distinction.

Now let us see what kind of structural description this would lead to for a given society. An exhaustive description would require several steps. Initially, it would be necessary to distinguish the various activity systems within the society. This is a matter of induction. There are as many activity systems as there are distinct decision-making models necessary to account for recorded behavior. Within each activity system we would strive to (a) map the categorical distinctions between interpersonal domains (e.g., activity, property, integrity), and between degrees of license within each domain, (b) make explicit the essential significata and specify the determination value these have for the previously designated categories of interpersonal behavior. Having achieved this, we would have arrived at a set of structural descriptions of interpersonal relations. With this information ego could determine, in any social context, with whom he may appropriately take decision-making license and whom he may appropriately permit to take decision-making license with him (provided he is able to identify all the significant elements accurately). To complete the description, however, the cultural principles (as distinct from structural principles) that apply within each behavioral category must be delineated. Generally speaking, we would expect that the greater the degree of license permitted, the less information is required to generate appropriate behavior. For example, in the domain of integrity:

- I(1) is likely to require extensive ceremonial information,
- I(2) a knowledge of the rules of etiquette,
- I(3) a knowledge of which behavioral forms are offensive,
- I(4) no information other than alter's limits of toleration,
- I(5) no information at all.

Before turning to the methods by which such a description might be developed, let us see how this kind of analysis measures up against our evaluative criteria. If properly executed, a description of the kind proposed would constitute a set of decision-making models that would permit the generation of appropriate behavior in the area of interpersonal relations. Such a description would approach the "emic" ideal to the extent that we are able to designate "essential" elements. The conceptual scheme employed is also systematic, permitting the

formulation of a set of mutually exclusive behavioral categories which encompass the universe of interpersonal behavior within a given society. If all conditions were satisfied, our models would reflect determinate relationships between decision-making principles and categories of behavior. The criterion that the resulting description should be capable of validation is also satisfied, for a decision-making model is predictive. To test its validity we can calculate to what extent the predictions it generates are accurate. The form these predictions will take are worthy of comment. Such models are not designed to predict specific behavior, but only the maximal degree of license that one class of persons will take with another. It is contended here that the way people *specifically* behave when the sociological context permits them freedom (license) is a matter of individual psychology, and beyond the scope of prediction from group-oriented models. The proposed scheme could be characterized as oriented toward the prediction of rather gross categories of phenomena, but with the demand that the predictive value of the model approach 100%. In addition to its other advantages, the kind of description advocated has the merit of limiting inferences regarding behavior, and consideration of meaning, to a minimum. The terms *restraint* and *license* refer to categories of observable behavior, and are solely *descriptive* in function. Of themselves, they imply neither legitimacy nor persistence, as do concepts like "rights and obligations," although these attributes can be inferred inductively when it suits our purpose. Finally, the proposed scheme of analysis is applicable to any social group for which the necessary information can be ascertained.

We shall now consider the methods that are appropriate to this kind of analysis.

III

Since decision-making models are conceived to constitute directives for social behavior, it follows that the only information that can be used to test their validity is overt behavior. The crucial methodological problems, however, lie in formulating descriptions of the models themselves. Here we can rely on a variety of techniques, each adapted to elicit the necessary data. One technique is, of course, the time-honored method of participant observation. This involves noting kinds of activities, dominant patterns of behavior between persons with different social characteristics, etc. Corrective statements made by individuals to one another and to the investigator are sources of hypotheses, as are disputes and arguments. An investigation of the content and process of socialization is likely to be particularly revealing. Perhaps one implication of the proposed type of analysis

for participant observation is that an investigator should (with some discretion) attempt to generate socially acceptable behavior in as many different circumstances as possible in order to test his understandings. This would contrast with the more passive observer role that some field workers have advocated. A second set of techniques, perhaps the most vital, involves the exploration, through interviewing, of our subjects' cognitive structure in the area of interpersonal relations. Further research is essential for the development of definitive techniques for eliciting the required information, but the explorations of folk taxonomy, as exemplified in the work of Conklin and Frake, and the use of "substitution frames" described by Metzger and Williams (1963) provide significant leads. One thing seems certain: semantic analysis of indigenous linguistic categories is a necessary part of such an investigation.

Since we are postulating a unilinear dimension (restraint—license) in each interpersonal domain, it should be possible to test results by applying Guttman scale analysis, as described by Goodenough (1963). Thus, if the categorization of the integrity domain is accurate for our hypothetical society, then I(4) should include all possible behavior in I(1-3), but should exclude some behavior possible in I(5), which in turn should include all behavior possible in I(1-4). If there are contradictions, such that behavior possible in a high restraint category is not possible in a low restraint category, or if no additional behavior is possible in low restraint as compared to high restraint categories, then the categorization must be revised.⁷ This kind of information can be obtained by postulating hypothetical circumstances to informants. For example, an informant might be asked questions in the following form: If A can do *x* to B, can he also do *y*? If the answer is affirmative, then *y* either belongs to the same category of license as *x* or to one of a lower order of restraint; if the answer is no, then *y* belongs to a higher category of restraint.

Once the universe of interpersonal behavior has been adequately categorized, the next step is to discover the essential significata. Here again, hypothetical circumstances might be posed to an informant. For instance, he might be asked, "If you were on a fishing expedition with A (who has characteristics a,b,c, . . . n) and you wanted to use some of his equipment, would you (1) feel too embarrassed to ask him, (2) offer to compensate him for its use, (3) explain why you needed it, (4) just ask him for it, (5) take it without asking." Each question should correspond to the categories on a particular scale. In this case they

⁷ "Possible behavior" here does not refer to specific acts, but to limits of license. Some specific forms of restraint behavior may be inappropriate when the significata specify considerable license, e.g., as in forms of address.

correspond to P(1-5) for the hypothetical society. Questions can be asked about either linguistic categories of people (e.g., uncles, chiefs, etc.) or real persons. The first method is useful for developing hypotheses about individual significata, while the second enables the investigator to learn about their occurrence in clusters, since any given individual will doubtless possess several social characteristics that are potentially relevant—he may be an uncle, village mate, chief, etc. The characteristics that are potentially determinate vary and may include the components of kinship, residential proximity, rank or role designations, religious and group affiliations, physical qualities, or anything else that people use in designating and identifying others. Using the second method, that is, asking the informant to respond to questions about named individuals, the investigator must abstract from each dyadic relationship (between the informant and each person named) the characteristics which he hypothesizes to be "essential." He would ultimately have a protocol for each informant that would look something like this:

(x,y,z . . . n)	(a,b,c, . . . n)	A(3)	P(3)	I(4)
(x,y,z . . . n)	(a,d,p . . . n)	A(2)	P(2)	I(1)
(x,y,o . . . n)	(b,m,p . . . n)	A(4)	P(4)	I(4)

And so on. It should be pointed out that the informants' attributes will not remain constant, but that some will vary vis-a-vis the person named. In other words, although some attributes may be independent (e.g., a person is either male or female), others are dependent (e.g., a person can be older than one individual, younger than another). Having gathered these data, hopefully for a reasonable sample of individuals, the problem is to extricate, by appropriate analytic procedures, those attributes that have determinate value for the rules of relationship. To be specific, an attribute can be considered to be an essential significatum if it affects the generality or intensity of license expressed between two persons, or classes of persons.

Other investigators undoubtedly could discover other methods, and it is entirely conceivable that methods must be adapted to suit the culture under investigation. It should be emphasized that the methods described are designed for deriving hypotheses; the crucial data must be derived from the social behavior of the people being studied.⁸

⁸ It has been pointed out to me by George Grace that my argument in this section parallels some of Chomsky's arguments in linguistics—that a linguistic description is a theory of a language, and that it is unreasonable to demand a discovery procedure that provides for the generation of valid theories. I would stand by this, inasmuch as I regard an ethnographic description to constitute a theory of a culture.

IV

The advocate of a conceptual scheme that proposes to cover as broad an area of human behavior as the one advanced in this paper must be prepared not only to defend its logic, but also to demonstrate its utility for resolving significant problems. Full documentation would require more space than is available, but I would like to explore briefly the implications of the proposed framework for a few limited areas: politics and social control.

Perhaps no area of anthropological investigation has been as thoroughly retarded by the traditional functional model of society as the study of political behavior. There are several reasons for this: the assumption of societal persistence; the loading in favor of institutionalized authority; and the idea that social behavior, of almost any kind, contributes to the integration of the "system." These assumptions have led the majority of social anthropologists to view political institutions and practices as, in the words of David Easton (1959:212), "of interest primarily for their effect on other institutions and practices of the society of which they are a part." Easton goes on to point out the difficulties in the traditional point of view:

One of the major consequences of the relegating of political data to accessory status has been that ambiguity, not to say confusion, continues to obscure the analytical distinction between political and other forms of social behavior. And this has meant in turn that in spite of the increasing volume of research touching upon primitive political life, we are left with no reliable test to tell us what is to be included in or excluded from that set of political relationships we call a political system. For the moment, it is not a matter of whether the description of such relationships is useful for research purposes, but only of whether a reasonably well articulated definition exists at all . . . the most impressive fact about the literature . . . is the degree to which the general properties of political relationships are either assumed to be known or briefly sketched in, as though the matter were not in the least problematic (1959:212-213).

In sum, the structural-functional point of view has led to virtual neglect of the study of political process, a corollary no doubt of the fact that the goal of political activity is presumed in the theoretical model, i.e., the maintenance of the group.

Another difficulty inherent in the traditional point of view is the necessity for circumscribing the social and/or political system in terms of group membership. How is the European administrative agency in a dependent community to be dealt with, for example? Is it part of the system, or extraneous to it? I submit that as community isolation breaks down in favor of participation in ever-

widening socio-economic spheres, the implausibility of conceiving social systems in terms of groups rather than activities becomes increasingly apparent. Furthermore, the opposing of structure, with its implications of group persistence, to process, simply fails to meet conceptual needs today; nor is it a logical necessity. Rather it is an artifact of the model that has been used. The kind of analysis which I suggest alleviates the necessity for such opposition, as structural and cultural principles are both conceived as elements which enter into decision-making processes. Neither can be considered without reference to the other if the analysis is to be complete. Not only does the conceptualization of social behavior in terms of decision-making lend itself to the analysis of process in general, but the conception of the systems as *activity systems* permits the specific discrimination of political activities. To illustrate these points, I turn once again to the hypothetical society.

Suppose that village meetings are held and that these constitute a distinct activity system in which the participants form three classes of persons, only one essential significatum defining each: (a) chiefs, (b) sub-chiefs, and (c) commoners. Then suppose that the rules of relationship, in matrix form, are as follows:

		ALTER		
		(a)	(b)	(c)
E G O	(a)	_____	A (5), P (3), I (3)	A (5), P (4), I (4)
	(b)	A (1), P (2), I (3)	_____	A (4), P (3), I (3)
	(c)	A (1), P (2), I (2)	A (3), P (3), I (3)	_____

To give the example more substance, the following cultural principles are assumed to apply in I (2-4):

I (2)—Ego should avoid expressing his own opinions unless called upon to do so; when asked, it is appropriate for him to offer his point of view, although this should be done humbly and should not contradict alter's opinion.

I (3)—Ego may express his own opinion freely so long as he does not insult alter, or imply that alter's opinions are foolish.

I (4)—Ego may express his own opinions without restraint, as long as he does not directly attack alter.

This information not only describes the social structure of the activity, but also provides a basis for understanding the manner in which political decisions are

reached. For example, it can be predicted that commoners will not respond to the opinions of chiefs with contradictory statements, whereas sub-chiefs sometimes will do so; generally, commoners will express their opinions in response to statements made by other commoners or sub-chiefs. When a decision requires the performance of activity, chiefs will not be required to submit their will to group approval, but will simply give directives to sub-chiefs and commoners. Sub-chiefs can be expected to make suggestions as to the activities commoners should perform. When material goods are required for communal purposes, it is predicted that suggestions made by sub-chiefs with respect to commoners' donations will be accompanied by legitimizing reasons, while chiefs will not necessarily justify their requests. These examples are oversimplified, to be sure, for in actual cases the definitions of behavioral categories will generally be more precise and extensive, yielding far more information than is included in this hypothetical case. Nevertheless, I think the point has been made—that structural analysis need not be opposed to a consideration of social process. Furthermore, "alien" classes of persons (e.g., colonial administrators) can be introduced into the systems without difficulty, as long as the rules of relationship that apply between them and other classes of participants are specified.

Finally, what are the implications of the proposed mode of analysis for the study of social control? There are several things to consider, including legitimacy, deviant behavior, and sanctions. To begin with, the following distinctions can be made with regard to the legitimacy of license: license behavior which is based upon principles (*significata*) which are cognitively shared and overtly agreed upon by the members of the group being described, may be considered as *formal license*. It is such license that underlies the concepts of "rights," "privileges," and "authority." This may also be conceived as "owned" license. Thus we can speak of "A" as owning a certain degree of license, e.g., P(4), over "B's" property. To the extent that A does not exceed the appropriate license allotted him, his behavior can be considered as legitimate. License behavior which is based upon principles that are not overtly agreed upon by the members of the group, but which are acceptable to the persons, or categories of persons, with whom license is taken, can be considered *granted license*. For example, the formal rules may prescribe that grandchildren show respect (i.e., restraint) to grandparents, but in fact some grandparents may grant considerable leeway to their grandchildren, possibly allowing them to take extreme license without any threat of reprisal. This might be based upon affection, or any idiosyncratic element in the relationship. In contrast to license behavior based upon formal *significata*, license based on such informal principles can be considered non-legitimate. Finally, behavioral

license which is based neither on formal significata nor grants from the affected parties can be termed *usurped license*. The stealing of property constitutes an example of usurped license, and can be considered illegitimate behavior.

Is it possible to distinguish these definitions operationally? An example will indicate that the question can be answered affirmatively. Suppose we derive a model of culturally recognized (i.e., formal) significata which suggests that within a given activity system a class of persons, A, can appropriately take a degree of license I(2) with a class of persons, B, who can appropriately take a degree of license I(3) with A. For this model, behavior between A and B in which neither exceeded the prescribed limits of license is by definition legitimate. But suppose that on certain occasions persons of class A exhibit behavior characteristic of I(5) toward B. There are three possibilities to account for this departure from the prescribed norm: (a) our model is inaccurate or incomplete, but it can be corrected at the socio-cultural level by altering the priority assigned to those factors originally included, or by adding formal significata not considered in the original model; (b) A has acted illegitimately, or (c) B has granted license to A.

If the first possibility is the correct one, it should be possible to reformulate the model either by altering the priority of significata, or by the inclusion of additional formal significata obtained by direct questioning, so as to account for all observed cases. If this cannot be done, we must presume that either the second or the third possibility has occurred. We can, of course, secure direct leads regarding the latter two alternatives by questioning informants. They will be able to distinguish between the two readily in most cases, but it is also advantageous to employ behavioral criteria. This is possible if certain forms of license can be regarded as constituting negative sanctions. From the point of view of the proposed framework, negative sanctions can be conceived as an exercise of extreme license inasmuch as a lack of restraint by the sanctioning agent in his behavior toward the offender is involved, whether this takes the form of personal abuse, confiscation of property, or forcible direction of the latter's activity. The sanctioning behavior may involve direct confrontation between the sanctioning agent and the offender, or it may be indirect, in the form of gossip, for example. Gossip constitutes an exercise of license over the integrity of the persons who are being gossiped about.

This leads to the problem of defining the sanctioning agent as a class of participants in an activity system. This problem can be resolved by considering all those who employ sanctioning behavior toward A as constituting a class of participants in an activity system initiated by A's excessive display of license toward B. The sanctioning class may correspond to an entire community, an organized

group within the community (e.g., lineage, council of chiefs, law enforcement agency, etc.), or an unorganized class of persons (e.g., males, persons of middle class, or members of a particular religious denomination). It is possible, of course, for one group of persons to respond with sanctioning behavior while another does not. In such an instance we can say that, operationally speaking, A's behavior was regarded as illegal by the sanctioning group, and as irrelevant, legitimate, or non-legitimate by the others.

The third possibility, that B has granted license to A, can only be properly explored after the other two possibilities have been eliminated. We can then hypothesize informal, or psychologically determined, significata to attempt to distinguish regularities that will account for the deviant cases. We can expect to discover such regularities to the extent that our subjects share a modal personality that leads them to react in the same way. These regularities must then be built into our final model if the ideal of 100% prediction is to be approached.

The distinction between formal and informal significata is of particular importance since it corresponds to a distinction between sociologically determined and psychologically determined decision-making principles. This permits us to put sociological and psychological analysis into mutually exclusive rather than overlapping realms. It should therefore help to reduce the confusion resulting from opposing the two as means of explaining social behavior.

This view also relieves us of the necessity of including only legitimate behavior in our structural models, and incidentally clears away much of the mysticism which has been given the concept of legitimacy by many social scientists. Thus we need assume neither a "group mind", nor unanimity of attitudes among members of the same society. In short, within the proposed scheme, legitimacy is an aspect of social behavior that is inferred from descriptive data; it is not presumed to be a part of the description of interpersonal relations. The advantages that such a view of legitimacy affords are several. For one thing, it provides a frame of reference for the study of deviant behavior that is logically consistent with the study of socially acceptable behavior. It allows us to operationalize our procedures, and to be inductive rather than deductive. We are also led to ask a number of significant questions. For example, with whom was a sanctioned deviant conceived to be taking too much license—another person, a particular group, society in general, a god or totemic ancestor, etc.? In a given society, what categories of persons are concerned with ego such that an attack on his integrity (or property) involves their own (i.e., stimulates them to impose sanctions)?⁹

9 An initial inquiry into this problem has been made by Howard and Howard, 1964.

How are the forms of sanctioning license related to particular expressions of illegitimate license? None of these questions are new, but when they are asked in the light of the overall frame of reference suggested in this paper, it is anticipated that they will promote new insights and perhaps provoke some questions that have not received sufficient attention by anthropologists.

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